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Back to the Roots. The Correspondence Between Leo 





Abstract: This paper will explore the correspondence be-
tween Leo Strauss and Jacob Klein, two thinkers of Jew-
ish origin with a keen interest in Greek origins. Besides 
being close friends, both were engaged in an attempt to 
recover the roots of Greek philosophy. The first section 
(I) briefly addresses the way in which Strauss and Klein 
responded to contemporary political developments. The 
second section (II), discusses some of the most striking 
elements in Strauss’ rediscovery of political philosophy, 
ancient and modern, as they become apparent in his let-
ters to Klein. The third and final section (III) focuses on 
Klein’s recovery of Greek philosophy.  
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When Martin Heidegger delivered a series of seminars on 
Plato’s Sophist in the early 1920s, most of those attending 
soon realized they were witnessing something remark-
able. Bracketing several centuries of scholarly commen-
tary, Heidegger chose to confront the dialogue in its own 
terms, reading Plato as a contemporary who had some-
thing worthwhile to say about questions of the utmost im-
portance.1  
 For many of his students, the seminars on the Sophist 
gave the decisive impulse for their own philosophical pro-
jects, either as a continuation of the path broken by 
Heidegger, or in critical deviation from it.2 Two students 
in particular, however, chose to remain as close as pos-
sible to the original impulse itself. As one of them later 
noted  “[Heidegger] intended to uproot Greek philosophy, 
especially Aristotle, but this presupposed the laying bare 
of its roots, the laying bare of it as it was and not just as it 
had come to appear in the light of the tradition and of 
modern philosophy.”3 Thus, Leo Strauss, speaking for 
himself and for his friend Jacob Klein, summed up the 
profound effect of Heidegger’s teaching.  
 This is substantiated when we turn to the correspond-
ence they held for four decades, and which was published 
in the third volume of Strauss’ Gesammelte Schriften.4 
The exchange provides us with some invaluable pieces of 
information about Strauss’s thought. In his letters, he pro-
nounces on some of his basic views, both philosophical 
and political, with rare clarity and candor. In addition, the 
correspondence enables us to determine what may have 
been Strauss’ intellectual akmè: the letters written be-
tween 1938 and 1939 – not surprisingly his most prolific 
period as a letter-writer – are a breath-taking report of his 
rediscovery of medieval and classical thought and its art 
of writing. 
 My discussion in this paper is divided in three parts. 
The first section (I) briefly addresses the way in which 
three salient features of contemporary politics come to 
light in the correspondence: the Jewish Question, the rise 
of Nazism, and political Zionism. The second section (II), 
discusses some of the most striking elements in Strauss’ 
rediscovery of political philosophy, ancient and modern. 
The third and final section (III) focuses on the philosophi-
cal relationship between Strauss and Klein, their differ-





Reading those letters that deal specifically with politics, 
one cannot help noticing the dark shadow of persecution. 
In March 1933, only days after Hitler forced the Enabling 
Act on the Reichstag, Klein notes: “There will never 
again be a parliamentary democracy in Germany – this 
much is certain.” (GS III 461) At the same time, however, 
he is still convinced that, in spite of growing anti-
Semitism and the lack of effective organized response 
from abroad, “The Jewish Question is not essential.” 
(Ibid.) Seven months later, when the first concentration 
camps are already operative, his perception appears to 
have changed little. Noting that “The Nazis are up and 
about to compromise everything that really matters”, he 
still does not believe that “the catastrophe will happen 
right now”, nor that “the present form of government in 
Germany will endure” (GS III 478). As for the Jewish 
Question, although it remains for him essentially a para-
digm of the plight of humanity as a whole, his concern 
has acquired an almost religious tone: “in my old age, I 
may become pious again...” (Ibid.)  
 By June 1934, shortly before the Night of the Long 
Knives, the blinders have fallen off. In a letter written 
from Denmark, Klein dramatically corrects his own pre-
vious view of Nazism as part of a more general anti-
liberal movement: “National Socialism has only one 
founding principle: anti-Semitism.” (GS III 512) Interest-
ingly enough, he presents this fundamental opposition in a 
theological cast: “It is indeed the first decisive battle be-
tween that which from of old bears the name of God and 
DAVID JANSSENS 
 26 
godlessness (‘Gott-losigkeit’). There’s no doubt about 
that. The battle is decisive, because it takes place on a 
battleground determined by Judaism: National Socialism 
is “perverted Judaism”, and nothing else: Judaism without 
God, i.e., a true contradictio in adiecto” (GS III 512-513).
 In the light of the predicament thus understood, Klein 
goes on to criticize Zionism for its pedestrian nationalism 
and its refusal to come to terms with the question of its 
own Judaic origins. This assessment provokes a spirited 
response from Strauss: although he agrees that Nazism is 
secularized Judaism, he rebukes his friend for his “the-
istic” turn (GS III 527), insisting that “there is no need to 
‘crawl back to the cross’, I mean, to speak of ‘God’” (GS 
III 516). Subsequently, he goes on to outline his position 
vis-à-vis Jewish orthodox faith with remarkable frank-
ness: 
And even if we were to be huddled into the ghetto once again 
and thus be compelled to go to the synagogue and to observe the 
law in its entirety, then this too we would have to do as philoso-
phers, i.e., with a reserve (Vorbehalt) which, if ever so tacit, 
must for that very reason be all the more determined. (...) That 
revelation and philosophy are at one in their opposition to soph-
istry, i.e., the whole of modern philosophy, I deny as little as 
you do. However, this doesn’t change anything regarding the 
fundamental difference between philosophy and revelation: phi-
losophy, while it may perhaps be brought under one roof with 
faith, prayer and preaching, can never be brought into agreement 
with them. (GS III 516) 
In the same letter, this distinction is subsequently reiter-
ated on a different plane. Rejoining Klein’s critical re-
marks on Zionism, Strauss appears to indicate that philo-
sophical reserve regarding religious orthodoxy necessarily 
finds its counterpart in adherence to “strictly political 
Zionism”: 
It is not without good reason that I have always been a “Zion-
ist”. In its motivation, Zionism is (...) the most respectable Jew-
ish movement - and, for that matter, only political Zionism, not 
‘cultural’ Zionism. And, in this respect, there is only one alter-
native: political Zionism or orthodoxy. (GS III 517) 
In this last remark, Strauss rehearses a thesis he had vigo-
rously defended in a number of publications written at the 
end of the 1920s, to wit that “political Zionism is the or-
ganization of unbelief within Judaism”, and that “Political 
Zionism, wishing to ground itself radically, must ground 
itself as unbelieving (sich als ungläubig begründen). The 
conflict between political Zionism and its radical oppo-
nents can only be conducted as a battle between belief 
and unbelief.”5 Thus, it is hardly surprising that his Zion-
ist writings of the 20s often voice sharp criticism of con-
temporary Jewish orthodoxy.6 
 Taken together, both passages make it clear that philo-
sophic unbelief underlies both Strauss’s thought and his 
action. Moreover, as the first passage shows, this unbelief 
must be distinguished from the unbelief characteristic of 
modern philosophy, which is disparaged as “sophistry”. 
In spite of their forcefulness, however, these assertions 
leave at least two questions unresolved. To begin with, 
Strauss’ insistence that there is no need to speak of God in 
addressing the Jewish Question stands in contrast to his 
own Zionist publications of the 1920’s, many of which 
deal with the theological-political problem explicitly and 
at considerable length. Second, and more important, it is 
not clear how his allegiance to un-modern unbelief corre-
lates with his adherence to a political movement that, as 
his own study of Spinoza’s Critique of Religion had led 
him to conclude, is heir to modern unbelief and “soph-
istry”.7  
 Apparently, Strauss soon became aware of this latter 
problem. In Philosophy and Law, published in 1935, he 
characterizes political Zionism as “a resolution that is in-
deed highly honorable but not, in earnest and in the long 
run, adequate”.8 Not surprisingly, this dismissal is wel-
comed by Klein, who had remained unconvinced by his 
friend’s earlier statement.9 Zionism, Klein had upheld, 
was incapable of facing “the problem of the uniqueness of 
the Jewish people”, a problem that could not be under-
stood “without the history of the Jews and thus without – 
‘God’” (GS III 519). It is not clear whether this remark 
had any influence on Strauss’s eventual change of percep-
tion. However this may be, it is perhaps not amiss to point 
out that in the autobiographical writings of the mid-’60’s, 
Strauss’s critique of political Zionism uses arguments 
reminiscent of Klein’s initial objections.10 
 Moreover, in his epistolary comments on Philosophy 
and Law, Klein provides an important clue to the under-
standing of a book that is now generally recognized as a 
turning point in Strauss’ intellectual odyssey. Referring to 
the introduction, where Strauss points out the Enlight-
enment’s failure to decisively refute revelation, Klein 
asks: “In any case, following your presentation, one could 
come to the result: why not orthodoxy?” (GS III 539) 
That, indeed, is the question bound to arise from Strauss’s 
key contention in Philosophy and Law that the “intellec-
tual probity” which he identifies as the “ultimate justifica-
tion” of the Enlightenment, is at the same time the fateful 
heir of biblical morality.11 If the conflict between ortho-
doxy and Enlightenment ultimately presents us with the 
choice between biblical faith and its rebellious derivative, 
why not choose the original? 
 In his letter, Klein, however, immediately goes to 
some length in answering his own question, by pointing 
to a “very, very important” distinction, made by Strauss in 
a footnote, between “the new probity” and “the old love 
of truth” (Ibid.) In the same footnote, Strauss stresses: “if 
one makes atheism, which is admittedly not demonstra-
ble, into a positive dogmatic premise, then the probity ex-
pressed by it is something very different from the love of 
truth”.12 Although the “old love of truth”, curiously en-
ough, is not mentioned anywhere else in the book, its in-
conspicuousness belies its importance.13 If anything, it 
indicates that Strauss envisages a third way besides the 
impossible alternative of orthodoxy or dogmatic atheism. 
In this respect, his choice of words deserves our attention, 
especially in a book devoted entirely to unearthing the 
connection between medieval Jewish and Islamic phi-
losophy and Plato. Having abandoned his adherence to 
the modern unbelief of political Zionism, and seeking to 
uphold his un-modern unbelief and “zetetic” scepticism in 
the face of orthodoxy and the dogmatically conscientious 
atheism of modern philosophy, it seems that Strauss is 









This impression is reinforced when we turn to consider 
the development of Strauss’s scholarly research as it is 
reflected in the exchange with Klein. At the moment of 
their debate on Nazism, Judaism and Zionism, Strauss is 
living in England and studying Hobbes. In his reports to 
Klein, he argues that Hobbes should be considered equal 
or even superior to Descartes as a founder of modernity: 
he surpasses his French contemporary in radicalness and 
originality, insofar as his critique of aristocratic virtue 
supplies the moral and anthropological basis to Descartes’ 
theoretical revolution. In support of this claim, Strauss 
advances the well-known thesis which is developed at 
length in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: the founda-
tions of Hobbes’s political philosophy were laid long be-
fore his espousal of the Cartesian scientific paradigm, and 
involved a momentous turn to history in the interest of the 
applicability of the philosophical precepts inherited from 
the Aristotelian tradition.15  
 However, the correspondence throws additional light 
on Strauss’s intentions with regard to a point that is never 
made fully explicit in The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. 
As Klein recognizes, the probing quest for the roots of 
Hobbes’s thought is conducted with the aim of reaching 
the fundamental level where a direct confrontation be-
comes possible between Hobbes and Socrates, between 
the father of modern political philosophy and the father of 
pre-modern political philosophy.16 In the book this con-
frontation is replaced by a confrontation between Hobbes 
and Plato (and, to a lesser extent, Aristotle). A closer look 
at the argument, however, reveals that Plato’s position is 
identified by questions that are unmistakably Socratic: the 
question of “what is good and fitting”, as well as the 
question “as to the aim of the State”.17 As a result, the 
conclusion of this confrontation can be transposed in 
terms of the confrontation as it was initially intended: 
Hobbes attempted to repeat the Socratic founding without 
understanding the full depth and complexity of the under-
lying Socratic question regarding the right way of life and 
the best state. 
 Of course, this criticism implies that, at this point, 
Strauss has already developed something like a new and 
unconventional interpretation of the Socratic-Platonic po-
sition. This, indeed, becomes apparent from a letter to 
Klein: just as in the case of Hobbes, he held it possible to 
gain access to Hobbes’s thought as a whole by starting 
from his politics, he now asserts: “I believe that the ques-
tion regarding the right way of life and the right state, as 
well as the answer to it, does not depend on answering the 
question regarding the being of the Ideas (...).”18 Further-
more, he suggests that understanding Socratic-Platonic 
politics requires recognition of its pre-modern, un-
dogmatic character, as well as a careful reading of the 
Platonic dialogues: “In any case, I believe it to be an es-
sential part of Plato’s concept of Sophistry that the dog-
matic denial of cosmic order is the basis of all sophistic 
politics, while the right politics is not based on the pre-
supposition of cosmic order (compare the plan of Pro-
tagoras’ speech in the Protagoras with the plan of the Ti-
maeus).” (GS III 529) 
 Other letters of the same period (1937-1938) confirm 
the impression that Strauss has begun to rediscover 
Plato’s art of writing as the key to understanding his dia-
logues.19 This breakthrough, moreover, is accompanied by 
a similar revolution in his understanding of medieval phi-
losophy, especially Maimonides. Earlier on, in Philoso-
phy and Law, he had concluded - albeit hesitatingly - that 
the Platonism of the falasifa lacked the “sharpness, origi-
nality, depth and – ambiguity of Platonic politics”.20 As 
he interpreted their position at that time, they held that 
prophecy – ultimately superior to philosophy – had an-
swered and fulfilled the Platonic requirement of an ideal 
law, thereby blunting the “questioning inquiry” under-
lying that requirement.  
 With the incipient recovery of exotericism, however, 
his view has completely reversed. Instead of blunting and 
modifying it, he now finds, the falasifa actually preserve 
and continue the Platonic inquiry and its equivocality. 
Writing from New York, where he has travelled from 
England to explore job opportunities at the beginning of 
1938, he informs his friend: 
 
Maimonides becomes ever more exciting. He was truly a free 
spirit. (...) The crucial question for him was not creation or 
eternity of the world (for he was convinced of the eternity of the 
world), but rather, whether the ideal lawgiver must be a prophet. 
And this question, he answered - in the negative, as did Farabi 
before him and Averroes at the same time. (GS III 545) 
 
Like Farabi and Averroes, Maimonides availed himself of 
Plato’s rhetoric in order to conceal and protect his philo-
sophic unbelief. In the letters following this initial 
avowal, Strauss reports with mounting enthusiasm and 
admiration about his exploration of the Guide, in an 
amazing crescendo of discoveries. “You cannot imagine 
the infinite cunning and irony with which Maimonides 
treats ‘religion’.” (GS III 549) In this respect, Mai-
monides is even seen to surpass the hero of Strauss’s 
youth: “The Guide is the most extraordinary book I, at 
least, know. That which N[ietzsche] had in mind in writ-
ing the Zarathustra, namely a parody of the Bible, 
M[aimonides] has accomplished on a much grander 
scale.” (GS III 553) 
 At the same time, Strauss is well aware of the contro-
versy his interpretation is bound to stir up: ‘When I let 
this bomb explode in a few years (...) a great battle will 
flare up’ (GS III 550). The stakes involved, he notes, are 
momentous. Reflecting on Maimonides’s stature for con-
temporary Judaism as a mediator between the biblical and 
the philosophical tradition, he notes: ‘the demonstration 
that Maim[onides] was simply not a Jew in his faith - [will 
turn] out to be of considerable significance for the pres-
ent: the fundamental irreconcilability of philosophy and 
Judaism (expressed “clearly” in the second chapter of 
Genesis) will be demonstrated ad oculos’ (Ibid.). In view 
of the possible consequences, it does not come entirely as 
a surprise to see Strauss entertaining second thoughts 
concerning his own strategy, perhaps comparing it to 
Maimonides’s Platonic tactic. Reverting to Nietzsche’s 
equally Platonic query - ‘when I hold the truth in my fist, 
may I open the fist?’ -, he observes: ‘our situation be-
comes ever more medieval, the difference between free-
dom of thinking and freedom of expression ever more 
visible. That is a kind of “progress”’ (Ibid.).21 At any rate, 
the prospects are not entirely bleak, he notes not without a 
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touch of ironic self-pity: ‘In short, I often shudder at what 
I have brought about by my interpretation. The end of it 
will be that I, poor devil, must ladle out the broth that di-
abolical magician of the 12th century has poured out for 
me’ (GS III 554). 
 This, however, is only the beginning of what soon 
turns out to be a consummate banquet. In rapid succes-
sion, Strauss begins to uncover the art of writing in a host 
of Greek writers, not only in philosophers such as Plato 
and Xenophon (as well as Aristotle), but also in historians 
like Herodotus and Thucydides, as well as in comic, 
tragic and epic poets, such as Aristophanes, Sophocles, 
Parmenides, Hesiod and even Homer. In a postscript, he 
tells Klein: ‘I begin to have an inkling of how misunder-
stood (‘unverstanden’) the ancients are’ (GS III 558). To 
give a detailed account of his findings is beyond the scope 
of this paper; moreover, many elements can be found in 
his works and need not be repeated here. Hence, I will 
limit myself to one or two points that remain somewhat 
oblique or ambiguous in his publications. 
 Compared to his published interpretations, to begin 
with, Strauss’ reports to Klein are far more candid regard-
ing the unorthodox and irreverent perspective of the said 
authors. What unites the latter, as they emerge in his in-
vestigations, is a veiled but deeply critical view of politi-
cal life, its characteristic ideals of courage (andreia) and 
gentlemanliness (kalokagathia), and its concomitant 
understanding of the Beautiful, the Just, and the Good. By 
means of ironic presentations of speeches and deeds, they 
reveal to the perceptive reader the lack of wisdom and 
moderation evinced by major political actors and dignita-
ries such as Pericles and Cyrus. Surreptitiously counter-
acting the sway of opinion, law and myth through the ju-
dicious use of opinion, law and myth, each in his writings 
aims at providing a true education (paideia) to wisdom.22 
 Nevertheless, the correspondence leaves many ques-
tions unanswered regarding Strauss’ understanding of the 
quarrel between philosophy and poetry. Though he rec-
ognizes the implicit claim of the Symposium that Socratic-
Platonic philosophy merges tragedy and comedy in a way 
that transcends and surpasses both, he argues the basic 
identity of the Platonic and the Xenophontic Socrates by 
approximating both to the wily Odysseus.23 The funda-
mental question of how the origins of Socratic philosophy 
are related to pre-Socratic poetry, especially Homer and 
Hesiod, has been explored with great competence and 
acumen by one of Strauss’s most gifted pupils, Seth Be-
nardete. The latter, in a tribute to his teacher, called this 
question “the most puzzling as well as the most unex-
pected aspect in Strauss’ recovery of Plato and philoso-
phy”.24 In fact, Strauss himself had provoked this puzzle-
ment and surprise, when he wrote the following to Be-
nardete: “Some day my belief that Homer started it all 
and that there was a continuous tradition from Homer to 





In Benardete’s account, we also find the following re-
mark: ‘There was at least one contemporary of Strauss 
who had an equally uncanny eye for the unnoticed but 
significant detail - what he noticed was surprisingly dif-
ferent from what Strauss did’.26 Although the contempo-
rary remains nameless, the index of the book teaches us 
that Benardete is referring to his other teacher, Jacob 
Klein.27 His judgment, moreover, is certainly pertinent: 
Klein’s talent as an interpreter of pre-modern philosophy 
and poetry is beyond question, as a brief look at his books 
suffices to show. While Plato takes pride of place, we also 
find careful and penetrating readings of Aristotle, Homer, 
Virgil, and Dante.28 In addition, we owe to Klein a num-
ber of treatises on the problem of speech and the art of 
writing that are a valuable complement to Strauss’ obser-
vations.29 
 However, Benardete is equally justified in stressing 
the difference between the two friends as to the yield of 
their interpretations, in particular with regard to Plato. A 
curious division of labor seems to exist between the two 
friends: whereas Klein’s published interpretations include 
the Meno, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Parmenides, 
Philebus, Ion, Phaedo, Phaedrus and Timaeus, Strauss’ 
printed studies are devoted to the Laws, Republic, States-
man, Minos, Euthydemus, Crito, Apology, Euthyphro and 
Symposium (the latter two, admittedly, were not prepared 
for publication). As one can see, the only dialogue that 
would allow a comparison of their interpretations is the 
Statesman.  
 Regardless of whether this division of labour was in 
any way intentional on the part of both friends or not, it 
does allow a preliminary determination of the difference 
in their respective approaches of Plato. While Strauss’ 
focus is clearly on the ‘political’ dialogues, Klein concen-
trates on those dialogues that, for want of a better term, 
one might call ‘scientific’, as they are traditionally under-
stood to deal mainly with cosmology, mathematics, on-
tology and metaphysics. In this respect, the strongly di-
vergent ways in which they approach the Platonic doc-
trine of Ideas are illustrative. Klein, who devotes con-
siderable energy to elucidating the problem of methexis 
[partaking] and of the koinonia tôn eidôn [community of 
Ideas], proceeds mainly within the horizon of mathemat-
ics and, guided by Aristotle’s critical comments, inter-
prets it as an ontology. 
 Strauss, on the other hand, raises this topic only with 
great caution and reticence, giving precedence to the Soc-
ratic question regarding the best life and the best state.30 
Earlier on, I quoted his assertion to Klein ‘that the ques-
tion regarding the right way of life and the right state, as 
well as the answer to it, does not depend on answering the 
question regarding the being of the Ideas (...)’ (GS III 
529). Klein, at any rate, seems to have held a direct ap-
proach to the latter question to be both possible and pre-
ferable. This difference recurs more conspicuously when 
Klein’s study of Greek Mathematical Thought is pub-
lished in 1934. In a letter praising the work, Strauss con-
cedes that his friend’s ontological interpretation renders 
problematic the ‘political’ reading of Plato. However, he 
immediately qualifies his assent unequivocally:  
 
In my view, you understand the “Good” too neutrally, too 
“philosophically”. More important than disagreements about 
great and small, hard and soft etc. are disagreements about the 
just and the unjust etc. Just as the latter are the primary impulse 
(Ansatz) of philosophy, so the Idea of the Good is the principle 
that must be interpreted starting from this impulse. (GS III 534) 
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Strauss, it appears, is more persistent than Klein in read-
ing Plato’s dialogues in the light of Socrates’ second sail-
ing, his turning away from the direct study of nature to 
the study of nature as it is reflected in human opinion 
about the most pressing human issues. Thus, two years 
later, in his book on Hobbes, he asserts that Plato ‘op-
poses to “physiology” not an “ontology” but dialectic’.31 
 This difference between a ‘political’ and a ‘scientific’ 
orientation recurs when we turn to their respective under-
standing of the quarrel between the ancients and the mod-
erns. For example, it is striking to see Klein and Strauss 
viewing one and the same problem - the importance of 
optics for Hobbes and Descartes - from different perspec-
tives, mathematics and physics on the one hand, anthro-
pology and politics on the other.32 Accordingly, Klein’s 
view of the modern side of the quarrel focuses on the 
founders of modern natural science (e.g. Descartes, Leib-
niz, Copernicus, Stevin, Vieta, Brache), whereas political 
philosophers (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and 
Rousseau) are predominant in Strauss’ outlook. 
 In spite of these differences, however, their accounts 
of the quarrel are in profound agreement on at least one 
decisive point: modern philosophy was founded on and in 
opposition to pre-modern philosophy on the basis of an 
insufficient understanding of the latter. In his book on 
Hobbes, Strauss attempts to show that the latter, deluded 
by the tradition, took for granted the possibility of politi-
cal philosophy and thus failed to regain the level of Soc-
ratic inquiry, where this possibility is the object of per-
manent re-examination. Similarly, Klein, in his study of 
Greek mathematics and afterward, never ceases to point 
out that the founders of modern science, deluded by the 
tradition, took for granted the possibility of science as 
they opposed what they considered to be their new and 
true science to what they disparaged as the old and false 
science. In modern science, he notes: 
 
(...) the “natural” foundations are replaced by a science already 
in existence, whose principles are denied, whose methods are 
rejected, whose “knowledge” is mocked - but whose place 
within human life as a whole is placed beyond all doubt. Scien-
tia appears as an inalienable human good, which may indeed 
become debased and distorted, but whose worth is beyond ques-
tion.33 
 
Moreover, in the same context, Klein provides a memo-
rable characterization of pre-modern science, as well as 
an outline of his task as a philosopher and historian in re-
covering it by reopening the quarrel. Without doubt, his 
friend was in full agreement: 
 
Here science stands in original and immediate opposition to a 
nonscientific attitude which yet is its soul and in which it recog-
nizes is own roots. In attempting to raise itself above this non-
scientific attitude, science preserves intact these given founda-
tions. It is therefore both possible and necessary to learn to see 
Greek science from the point of view of this, its “natural” basis. 
In its sum-total Greek science represents the whole complex of 
those “natural” cognitions which are implied in a prescientific 
activity moving within the realm of opinion and supported by a 
preconceptual understanding of the world.34 
 
Whether in the guise of the natural cosmic order or in that 
of natural right, what binds Klein and Strauss is the prob-
lem of nature in all its attractive elusiveness. In all of their 
interpretations of pre-modern and modern thinkers – but 
also in their shared preoccupation with the question of 
liberal education – both are constantly mindful of it. That 
is how they pay their respects to the importance of return-
ing to the beginnings of science. Although this import-
ance had been first impressed upon them by the phenom-
enology of Husserl and his radical pupil Heidegger, its 
full dimensions only became visible to them through 
Plato.35 In this respect, Klein beautifully and truthfully 
seizes the heart of their friendship in the dedication he 
added to Strauss’ copy of Greek Mathematical Thought: 
beyond their agreements and disagreements, he writes, is 
the certitude that ‘Plato’s dialogue leads us out of the 
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